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The massive rise of academic patenting and licensing in the US and Europe
For most of the 20 th century, US universities were clearly hesitant about getting involved with patenting and licensing of research results produced by their faculty. Especially in relation to medical patents, opposition was widespread. According to Mowery et al., 
in their impressive book Ivory tower and industrial innovation:
In part, this ambivalence reflected concerns that any appearance of profiteering at public expense would be politically embarrassing. (Mowery et al. 2004: 4) a Well into the 1960s ... [m] any institutions continued to avoid direct involvement in patent administration, and others maintained a hands-off attitude towards patents altogether. Columbia [University's] policy left patenting to the inventor and patent administration to the Research Corporation, stating that "it is not deemed within the sphere of the University's scholarly objectives" to hold patents, and Harvard, Yale, and Johns Hopkins adopted similar positions. All of these universities ... discouraged or prohibited medical patents. Other universities allowed patents on biomedical inventions only if it was clear that patenting would be in the public interest. However, this attitude has changed. Since the early 1980s in the US and the 1990s in Europe, academic patenting and licensing activities have massively increased, particularly in biomedical fields and some fields of engineering. Between 1980 and 2004, the number of US patents obtained by universities increased almost sixteen-fold. The strategies universities use to defend and extend their patents are sometimes very aggressive, which leads to growing irritation on the part of industry (Wysocki 2004; Bagley 2006; Thursby & Thursby 2005; Vest 2005: 85; Nelson 2001: 17) . In fiscal year (FY) 2004, circa 154 US universities collected more than $1 billion in net patent licensing income, signed 3928 new licences, and obtained over 3800 U.S. patents (AUTM 2005) . In 2006, 4963 new licences were signed, 3255 U.S. patents were issued and 553 spin-off companies were set up (AUTM 2007) . The number of technology transfer offices (TTOs) in the US has also mushroomed: in 1980 there were only 25 active TTOs; in 2005 there were 3300 (Pollarito 2005) . Indeed: "Technology transfer has become a multi-billion dollar industry unto itself" (Ritchie de Larena: Part V, opening paragraph).
Recently, figures for Europe became available which show the same trend of a very fast increase in the number of academic patents and licences (ProTon Europe 2007 Two other trends are also apparent, which will briefly be commented on in the next two sections: the increasing number of 'upstream' patents and the preponderance of exclusive -as opposed to non-exclusive -licences.
The increasing number of 'upstream' patents
An increasing number of patents, including academic patents and university spin-off patents, are being applied for and obtained for the results of 'upstream' research -sometimes referred to as patenting of 'research tools' or 'inputs to science'-d particularly in biomedical fields as well as nanotechnology (Lemley 2005; Geiger & Sa 2008) . As noted by Geiger and Sa:
In their zeal to patent, universities have engaged in practices that can scarcely be regarded as compatible with the public interest. These include claiming ownership over fundamental scientific knowledge or research tools … (Geiger & Sa 2008: 144) The patenting of research tools by universities seems an almost inevitable result of the pressure on universities to patent -pressure which comes from both within and outside the university (cf. section 5 below). The basic or early stage research for which universities receive funding is often such as leads to the discovery of techniques useful in later stage research, i.e. research which universities are not generally funded to carry out. Whilst manufacturing industries are more interested in patenting end products and hence may choose to keep research tools secret, this option may not be available to universities if they have neither the funds for nor the interest in carrying out the later stage research which leads to those end products. The shortage of funding to perform later stage research and hence the drive to patent 'upstream' research results applies similarly to university spin-offs.
Such patents pose particular problems (Heller & Eisenberg 1998; Eisenberg 2001; Rai 1999; Nelson 2001) . A proliferation of intellectual property rights on results of 'upstream' researchi.e. early in the pipeline -may stifle 'downstream' research and development, as the greater the number of people whose agreement has to be obtained in order to allow a project to proceed, the higher the risk that bargaining will fail or that transaction costs will become too high. This will be even more likely if the property rights belong to actors in both the public and the private sector, with different institutional agendas. Just as too few property rights can lead to overuse of resources in a 'tragedy of the commons', too many property rights can cause underuse of resources in a 'tragedy of the anticommons' if too many owners can block each other. Hence, future research can be stalled as a result of the:
[C]omplex obstacles that arise when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful product. Each upstream patent allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of downstream ... innovation. (Heller & Eisenberg 1998: 698) More concretely, proliferation of 'upstream' patents leads to royalty stacking and a reduced number of 'players' in the research field, both of which hinder or limit the arrival of new products onto the market.
The problem of 'royalty stacking' (or 'licence stacking') is clearly explained by Heller & Eisenberg: [A]n RTLA (reach-through license agreement) gives the owner of a patented invention, used in upstream stages of research, rights in subsequent downstream discoveries. Such rights may take the form of a royalty on sales that result from use of the upstream research tool, an exclusive or nonexclusive license on future discoveries, or an option to acquire such a license. ... RTLAs may lead to an anticommons as upstream owners stack overlapping and inconsistent claims on potential downstream products. In effect, the use of RTLAs gives each upstream patent owner a continuing right to be present at the bargaining table as a research project moves downstream toward product development. (Ibid.) Thus the result of such 'stacking' can be that the product reaches the market but only after extended delays due to licence negotiations or at a price which is affordable to few of the possible users, or even that the product does not reach the market at all.
In addition, 'upstream patenting' reduces the number of players in the research field. More specifically, unlike traditional patents to commercial end products, which are rarely infringed by university researchers, 'research tool' patents cover almost by definition the type of research carried out by academics. While academics may fondly believe that their research cannot infringe patents, unlicensed use of patented research tools by university researchers in the US and most of Europe would almost certainly constitute patent infringement (cf. section 4 below). Accordingly, research tool patents act not only to exclude commercial research players but also academic ones. Clearly, the less a field of research is explored, the fewer the products that can be expected to emerge from it.
The high proportion of exclusive licences
Our focus should not only be on patenting per se, for the way universities design their licensing policies can also have a significant impact on the 'social return' of publicly funded research. Thus, for example, in a survey of 112 industry-based licensing executives of companies that either licensed-in university inventions or sponsored academic research, it was found that 27% of university licences include clauses allowing the industry partner to delete information from publications, while 44% allow the industry partner to delay publication .
While before the entry into force of the Bayh-Dole Act (cf. section 5 below) university licensing was often non-exclusive (Slaughter & Leslie 2000: 143-144) , research by Stanford Law Professor Mark Lemley has shown that currently the vast majority of licences granted under university patents are exclusive (Lemley 2007) . This tendency to grant exclusive licences has benefits and disadvantages for both the university in question and society at large. For embryonic technologies -and university inventions often are (Jensen et al. 2003; )-TTOs may struggle to find more than one potential licensee (Geiger & Sa 2008: 35, 131) and it is understandable that licensees will demand exclusivity since the further development necessary to bring a product to market involves major investment of time and money. However, in other circumstances, the financial pressures on the TTOs to maximize royalty can be the basis for exclusive licences being granted (see e.g. Owen-Smith, who has done extensive interviews in two research universities, one successful in its commercialization activities and one much less so, contrasts the attitudes to exclusive licensing between the two:
"I think the only value of a patent comes when you provide an exclusive arrangement. All the licenses that we have, according to our policies, are exclusives[...] You asked me about exclusive versus non-exclusive, but I am pretty much set up to get people to sign exclusives." (Ibid.: 205, quoting from an interview with a staff member of a not very successful TTO) "Well, I suspect that at some point you come to a fork in the road and you have to make a choice between the most important thing, whether that is getting the licensing revenue or transferring the technology. We have chosen, time and again, that the most important thing is transferring the technology[...]" (Ibid.: 206, quoting from an interview with a staff member of a successful TTO)
Exclusive licensing, moreover, raises some risk that scarce university financial resources are diverted into litigation. Where a patent for a technology critical for the development of a product in a new field is licensed exclusively, companies wishing to enter that field have little option but to ignore or seek to revoke the patent.
In addition to the general problem that academic patenting and licensing amount to double taxation, e the developments discussed above pose various specific problems which are the topic of this section.
A pro-IP culture may have negative effects on the sharing of research results among academics (see for example Blumenthal et al. 1997; Campbell et al. 2002; Liebeskind 2001; Washburn 2005; Grushcow 2004; Bok 2003) . Margo Bagley, a Law Professor at Virginia University, summarises it neatly:
[T]oday, academic researchers are being encouraged by technology transfer offices ... and industry sponsors to delay publishing and presenting their work until after filing a patent application and sometimes even longer than that. ... While not amenable to precise quantification, the stifling of discourse and the erosion in the norms of sharing and colloquy historically associated with the scholarly enterprise are costs that must be balanced against the technology transfer gains. (Bagley 2006 : 2-3) Encroachment on traditional sharing norms now often comes from university intellectual property policies codified in faculty hand-books and in the instructions of TTO personnel to vet inventive work through the office before publishing or presenting it to avoid the loss of potential patent rights. (Ibid.: 12) Former Harvard University President Derek Bok makes the following more general comments in this regard:
Universities have paid a price for industry support through excessive secrecy … and corporate efforts to manipulate or suppress research results. No consensus has yet emerged on how to contain these threats to academic science. … Most universities have not done all they should to protect the integrity of their research. Many have not even shown that they are seriously concerned about doing so. (Bok 2003: 77) Current university policies on patenting and licensing may also affect the direction of academic research (Geuna & Nesta 2003: 16; Powell & Owen-Smith 2002: 124) . Research funding as well as research efforts may be redirected from non-commercialisable to commercialisable areas -a shift which may imply a redirection from fundamental to applied research as well as from research in the arts and humanities to research in the 'hard' sciences. Reorientation of academic research may also take place as a result of emphasis on commercial or entrepreneurial criteria in procedures for the hiring of academic staff (Geiger & Sa 2008: 178, 180 It also seems clear that the current emphasis on commercialization of academic work raises the risk of further sidelining the importance of educating students. As Geuna and Nesta observe:
If patent output is to be used in the academic evaluation process (as is already happening in a few countries and as is being promoted by some policy reviews), this will create incentives for researchers to reduce their time/commitment to some of their activities -and, given the current weighting scheme, teaching will be the activity likely to suffer the highest time reduction. (Geuna & Nesta 2003 : 17, referring to Stephan 2001 Another serious potentially negative effect is the risk of universities being sued for patent infringement in countries that don't have a sufficiently broad 'research exemption' in their patent law. h This has become all too clear in the US, with the decision in the case Madey v. Duke. The significance of this decision is clearly explained as follows by Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner:
Historically, universities and others engaged in academic research [in the US] have not typically been targets of patent infringement suits. This is partly because there is a doctrine in [US] patent law of an "experimental use exception," whereby otherwise infringing activity cannot be prevented if it occurs "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." But it has never been clear that this narrow exception covers much of what universities do; the fact that they have rarely been sued in the past may have been due to a lack of concern or focus by patent holders as much as a belief that universities were truly exempt. (Jaffe & Lerner 2004: 65) However, as they observe, this situation is changing: The CAFC overruled an earlier decision by a District Court judge in favour of Duke Universitywhich construed the 'research exemption' broadly as covering activities "solely for research, academic or experimental purposes". i In the view of the CAFC, this construction of the exemption was much broader than the traditional test, which limited the exemption to activities "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry". j The CAFC concluded that:
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavour for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.
In June 2003 the US Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the CAFC decision.
Under the CAFC's interpretation, most basic research will not be considered as exempted from patent infringement suits -an alarming state of affairs, for access to technologies and materials is vital for much basic research. Forcing academic researchers to seek licences may result in research being reduced, delayed or foregone.
Why do policy-makers seem to ignore these problematic aspects of academic patenting and licensing?
As noted by Harold Shapiro, President Emeritus of Princeton University:
[I]t is easier for the university acting alone to identify the benefits of increasing its involvement with private markets-which are mainly internal and accrue in the short run-than to identify the costs, which are more difficult to assess, lie further in the future, and are more likely to fall on the shoulders of the community of research universities as a whole rather than on individual institutions. (Shapiro 2005: 17) In spite of all the potential and real problems discussed in the previous section, various policymakers strongly defend and encourage academic patenting and licensing as the way to promote 'knowledge transfer' or 'technology transfer' from academia to industry (Geuna 2001; Nowotny et al. 2003; Slaughter & Leslie 1997) . As noted by Geiger and Sa:
The expectation that universities should optimize their economic relevance [i.e. not only generate inventions, but also take steps to ensure that the inventions will be transferred to and developed into innovations in the private sector] is endorsed by a broad coalition of legislators, entrepreneurs, economic growth pundits, and academic leaders. Although American universities have long engaged in some of these activities, and have greatly enlarged this role since about 1980, the twenty-first century has witnessed an intensification of external inducements and internal willingness to emphasize these tasks. (Geiger & Sa 2008: 1) k Might it be the case that the negative effects discussed above are the price we must pay for technology transfer which is vital to our economies? Several empirical studies − all based on responses obtained through interviews or surveys from senior managers in different industrial sectors − show that academic patenting and licensing are not the main channels for such transfer. Three such studies are briefly summarised here.
A first study which needs mentioning is Edwin Mansfield's survey, asking senior industry managers what proportion of their innovations either would not have been developed or would have been developed only significantly later in the absence of recent university research (Mansfield 1991) . A second, similar example of pertinent empirical research is the so-called 'Yale Survey' (Levin et al. 1987) . A third study is known as the 'Carnegie-Mellon Survey' (Cohen et al. 2002) . This is even more important than the other two, as it is more recent, and because it also asked senior research managers from industry which were the most important channels via which corporations obtained access to the results of academic research to be applied in their innovations.
One of the main conclusions from each of these studies is that the importance of academic research for industrial innovation varies considerably between industries. In fact, only in biomedical fields -particularly pharmaceuticals and biotechnology -does university research appear to significantly and directly influence industrial innovation.
As noted earlier, the 'Carnegie-Mellon Survey' also asked industrial research managers to rate the importance of various information channels to industrial R&D. Interestingly, even according to managers from the pharmaceutical sector, the most important sources of information are not agreements with universities on patenting and licensing -even though these are regarded as very important -but research publications and conferences. Respondents from most other industries considered university patents and licences to be of very little importance to industrial R&D.
The question arises as to why these empirical findings are ignored by policymakers. Why is the pro-IP culture in academia growing stronger rather than being reoriented to take account of the abovementioned problems? A number of arguments are invoked to justify policies which encourage academic patenting and licensing:
First argument: strengthening the regional economy
In policy documents of international bodies, governments and universities, it is argued increasingly frequently that, through patenting and licensing, universities can promote the regional economy, e.g. by addressing technical problems faced by regional industries and by creating marketable products and jobs.
Admittedly, encouraging academics to generate things which are of value to the community can be a good thing, but universities can do this without getting entangled with patenting and licensing.
Second argument: more money for universities
Some say that, through their involvement in patenting and licensing, universities may generate revenue for themselves. Generating additional revenue is increasingly seen as necessary in view of the decline of government funding of universities (Geuna 2001 Continuous competition from other universities and constant requests for new programs from department chairs and other professors create a relentless demand for greater resources. Driven by these financial needs, university leaders rarely encounter any constituent pressures or procedural safeguards strong enough to force them to conduct their search for funds with a consistent respect for academic values. (Bok 2003: 186) The licensing revenues, even of universities which have extensive experience with patenting and licensing, are dominated by a very small number of outstandingly successful inventions (often in the biomedical field) (Thursby & Thursby 2005: 190 (Thursby & Thursby 2005: 203) . In the perception of the surveyed TTOs, university faculty consider sponsored research funding more important than licence revenue (ibid.), which illustrates the tension experienced by the TTOs in trying to serve two masters, central administration and faculty. From the TTO's perspective, the second most important success indicator, the number of inventions commercialized, is regarded as much less important by both central administration and faculty (ibid.). If this would be correct, then only the TTOs would appear to believe the rhetoric of the university mission statements that stress the importance of benefiting society at large by transforming academic research into concrete products.
Geiger and Sa note that TTOs are dominated by a "revenue maximization model" (Geiger & Sa 2008: 142,) , which can be seen in practices such as:
[ 
Third argument: incentive to invent
A major aspect of the classic utilitarian justification of the patent system is that it provides an indispensible incentive to invent. It is sometimes claimed that this incentive effect may be real in an industry context but has very little relevance for academia, because academic researchers are 'paid to invent' and hence don't need any additional encouragement. n However, the argument does have some force: o even though academics are paid to do research, this does not necessarily imply that they make inventions. Generating information from research is not the same thing as generating inventions.
The pressure on the academic to publish new knowledge revealed by her research is not the same as pressure to consider the possible ways in which that knowledge might be utilized commercially. Since it is the originality of research that has traditionally been valued amongst academic scientists, there has moreover been little incentive for the academic to investigate the suitability of the new knowledge for such commercial end uses. With a pressure from the university to patent, there indeed comes a pressure on the academic to consider how to turn the new knowledge into a patentable invention.
Fourth argument: incentive to innovate
The most frequently invoked argument for universities' involvement with patenting and licensing is that this is a key enabling factor in the process of transforming research results into products or processes with market value, a process otherwise known as 'innovation'. Indeed, commercialising an invention may involve developing or improving technologies to manufacture the invention, performing additional scientific testing of the invention, performing pre-and postmarketing research and advertising the product or process, all of which require investment.
As noted by Abramowicz:
Inventors sometimes might need to engage in inventive activity and seek patents well before commercialization is possible, lest they lose the patent race. ...
[C]ompetition among inventors [forces] patenting at an early stage, often so early that patentees will be quite unsure whether it will be worthwhile to ever [develop the invention]. (Abramowicz: 9) p
The question which concerns us here is whether the 'commercialization argument' is convincing in the case of academic inventions. Mowery, Nelson, Sampat and Ziedonis have analysed this issue in great detail (Mowery et al. 2004) in the context of their study of the effects of the US BayhDole Act (1980), a law which was intended to promote the commercialization of federally funded inventions (including federally funded academic inventions). q Mowery and his colleagues have investigated the patenting and licensing activities of three universities which were the leading recipients of licensing income through much of the 1990s: the University of California, Stanford University and Columbia University. One of the most significant findings of their study is that both before and after the entry into force of the Bayh-Dole Act, a lot of technology transfer took (and still takes) place even in the absence of academic patenting and licensing.
It is important to keep in mind that the overriding goal of the Bayh-Dole Act was and continues to be to produce the greatest public benefit. The objectives mentioned in the Preamble to the Act include: "to promote the utilization of inventions", "[for inventions to be] used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery", to "promote commercialization and public availability of inventions" and to "protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions". How the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act can be achieved -and whether patenting and licensing by the university is at all necessarywill often vary depending on the sector of technology and even the nature of the invention.
The popular view, which was also the key justification for adopting the Bayh-Dole Act, viz. that academic patenting and licensing are essential to achieve commercial development of academic knowledge, is in need of revision. For on the one hand, academic patenting and licensing turn out to be much less vital for commercialization of academic knowledge than is claimed by the dominant view, and on the other hand the pro-IP culture which has become so widespread in academia has several undesired effects and paradoxical consequences.
The 'prevailing wisdom' fails to see the real-world consequences of academic patenting and licensing. Although the empirical support for the pro-IP arguments discussed earlier turns out to be weak, these arguments continue to play a major role in policy-making, both at the level of universities and at the level of governments. What can be done to solve this problem? How can policy-making in this field be improved in the short term? r
Some comments on potential solutions
This final section of the paper makes some suggestions for reorienting academic patenting and licensing policies in order to curb the erosion of traditional academic norms and to bring the public interest back into focus.
Some universities are already taking steps in this direction. Stanford University, for example, has a policy that contains at least two unusual features intended to facilitate technology transfer (Stanford University). Firstly, despite the fact that the university claims ownership of all inventions made by faculty and staff, the inventors retain the right to place inventions into the public domain, ie to require no licence for their use, if this is deemed to be in the best interests of technology transfer. Secondly, Stanford University has an extremely simple procedure for material transfer agreements (MTAs), i.e. for the exchange of 'tangible research products'.
s Where the recipient is in academia or a not-for-profit institution, no MTA is required. Where the recipient is in industry, three options are open to the donor: where the donor is certain that the material will be used for research purposes only, then again no MTA is required, and where the donor is uncertain he may either insist on an MTA where the recipient confirms use will be only for research purposes or he may refer the matter to the TTO for licensing.
Indeed, standardising MTAs in this way removes a barrier to academic cooperation and hence is one step towards reversing the current erosion of the key academic values of collaboration and openness.
Other suggestions which deserve further consideration can be split into three categories: a first which requires change in policy by universities; a second which necessitates change in national law; and a third which needs international agreement. Our focus here will be on the level of university policies. t
The proposals listed below are aimed at improving university policies which relate to research collaborations and to the operation of the Technology Transfer Offices. To a large extent, with these proposals we aim to suggest that universities should instruct their TTOs to act for the benefit of academic cooperation and public access to research results.
First proposal: Universities must not enter into research or licensing agreements with industry that permit suppression or unreasonable delay of publication.
At first glance this would appear to be self-evident and it might surprise many readers that it is not a policy already in existence. However, as noted in section 3, it is not. To give a simple example, one should consider the case of clinical trials carried out by academic medics, where it has been common practice for the sponsoring company to be in a position to delay, edit or suppress publication of less than favourable results (see for example Washburn 2005 and Smith 2006 for several examples).
u
Second proposal: Require licences to be non-exclusive unless exclusivity can be convincingly justified, for example on the basis that development requires large and long term investment.
Since academic research is largely funded by the state, the use of IP rights to maximise the sale price of products stemming from this research represents a double payment by the public. This is avoided and the broad diffusion of the fruits of the research is encouraged by non-exclusive licensing, a strategy which nonetheless provides the university with a financial incentive to promote such diffusion. However, we accept that where extraordinary levels of investment are required to proceed from the research results to the marketplace, licence exclusivity may be necessary in order to allow the licensee to recoup that investment. One of the primary functions of a university is to provide services to the community. In as far as university research is concerned, one facet of this responsibility is surely to ensure that where research leads to products which meet a pressing need, those products are made accessible to the community. This is particularly relevant to essential drugs and other means for reducing disease burden, as well as for example to techniques for reducing pollution and increasing crop yieldsmore generally, this requirement relates to basic needs which are not met by existing products or which are met but at too high a cost.
Failure to meet these public interest goals could be sanctioned for example by loss of exclusivity, reduction of licence term, reduction in licence territory, etc.
Fourth proposal: As part of any licence agreement, require licensees to agree not to sue universities for IP infringement.
As discussed earlier, certain aspects of academic research in certain countries may not count as patent infringement, but other aspects do and in the US, for example, the research exemption is currently almost meaningless. By their own collective actions, however, universities can claw back some freedom to carry out research without fear of incurring legal costs or damages or otherwise wasting scarce resources in litigation (including inter-university litigation).
The larger the number of universities that adopt such a policy of not suing other universities for IP infringement and requiring the same of licensees, the more effective it will be for all universities and the more beneficial it will be for scientific progress. Admittedly, academic patenting and licensing can generate significant social benefits, but these are not likely to be achieved by following the current approach of blindly promoting a pro-IP culture with hardly any attention being paid to negative effects and paradoxical consequences.
Conclusion

As Lemley puts it:
University technology transfer ought to have as its goal maximizing the social impact of technology, not merely maximizing the university's licensing revenue. A university ... is a publicregarding institution that should be advancing the development and spread of knowledge and the beneficial use of that knowledge. (Lemley 2007: 14) Unfortunately, this part of the story seems to have been somewhat lost along the way in the designing of academic patenting and licensing policies. However, better ways of doing these things are possible and urgently need to be implemented.
procedures, publication of results, use of graduate student assistants, and the character of the research itself." (Rhodes 2001: 178) g As to Thursby & Thursby (2002) , this is certainly an interesting article, but it is only based on a productivity analysis of AUTM survey data for 64 US universities and on a survey of businesses which have licensed university inventions. One may wonder how, based on data of this nature, firm conclusions could be drawn regarding the redirection of academic research as a result of increasing emphasis by university administrators on the importance of patenting and licensing, given that Thursby and Thursby have not surveyed academic researchers or university administrators and, moreover, in their survey of businesses were asking representatives of businesses what factors were responsible for increased licensing by businesses of university inventions, and not whether the respondents thought there had been a redirection of academic research. Although among the potential reasons behind the increase of licensing suggested in the survey questions, the factor "faculty research is more oriented toward the needs of business" was weighted less heavily by the business representatives than some of the other factors, this factor was nevertheless perceived to be a major one. As Thursby and Thursby themselves admit: "Since [our work does not examine] the pattern of faculty research, we cannot reject the notion that faculty research has shifted." (Thursby & Thursby 2002: 92) Moreover, in a later paper - Thursby & Thursby (2005) -the same authors say that: "one can argue that the number who noted the importance of a change in faculty orientation signals a problem" (Thursby & Thursby 2005: 197) . As to Geiger and Sa, even though they note in the introduction to their book that: "economic relevance has not produced a tilt toward applied research" (Geiger & Sa 2008: 6) , Chapter 5 of the book contains numerous examples which seem to serve as evidence to the contrary (see e.g. at pages 170, 171, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180 and 184 The same also applies outside the US, as is evidenced for example by the change of national laws in Germany, Denmark and Norway, to allow universities to claim ownership of inventions made by research staff, and by the change in the statutes of Oxford University to specify that all inventions made by members of the university belong to the university. See for example Leistner (2004) .
l James Duderstadt, President Emeritus of the University of Michigan, is one of the many former and current US university presidents who lament this decline in funding. Interestingly, he regards the Bayh-Dole Act as a step down the slippery slope of university education becoming a private rather than a public good. As Duderstadt puts it: "Today … we find an erosion in the perception of education as a public good deserving of strong societal support. Our society seems to have forgotten the broader purposes and benefits of the university as a place where both the young and the experienced can acquire not only knowledge and skills but the values and discipline of an educated mind … where we defend and propagate our cultural and intellectual heritage … and where new knowledge is created through research and scholarship and applied through social engagement to serve society. Whether a deliberate or unconscious response to the tightening tax constraints and changing priorities for public funds, … the new message is that education has become a private good that should be paid for by the individuals who benefit most directly: students, patients, business, and other patrons from the private sector. Government policies such as the Bayh-Dole Act that not only enable but intensify the capacity of universities to capture and market the commercial value of the 'Short term' solutions are understood here as opposed to solutions which would imply major modifications of patent laws, e.g. modifications of the novelty requirement for patentability, as proposed in Bagley (2006) , or modifications of the requirement of susceptibility of industrial application. While such longer term solutions are necessary, the urgency of the matter is such that short term solutions should be investigated and put into place with minimum delay.
s MTAs restrict the use of materials and data. An MTA is a contract between the donor and the recipient of a material which the donor is providing to the recipient. Frequently an MTA may forbid the recipient to analyse the material or to seek intellectual property rights in anything resulting from use of the material, and to publish results of experiments using the material. Some MTAs go so far as to provide that the intellectual property rights resulting from the recipient's use of the material shall belong to the donor. MTAs are becoming more and more widespread, and they are imposing increasingly complex and onerous terms. They typically forbid researchers receiving material to share that material with other institutions and may require pre-publication review of research results. As they are contractual agreements (e.g. between a university and company or between different universities), MTAs are not geographically or temporally limited. In this respect they differ from patents and can have even more far-reaching effects. See for example Streitz & Bennett (2003) and Pool (2000) . One suggestion requiring change in national law would be to make the research exemption to patent infringement explicitly cover all research by not-for-profit or public bodies, including universities, and hence shield them from litigation. Perhaps this should even extend to all areas of intellectual property, including in particular copyright. One example of a remedy necessitating agreement at an international level would be to adopt a one year grace period, similar to that already in US patent law. This would permit researchers to publish before patenting and hence would facilitate scientific openness. These and other proposals cannot be elaborated here.
u One of the particularly striking examples discussed by Washburn (2005: 19-20) relates to the long delay in publication of findings on the effectiveness of different thyroid medications. Betty Dong, a scientist working at the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) discovered in 1990 that Synthroid, a drug which at that time was taken by 8 million Americans every day, was no more effective than three cheaper drugs. The pharmaceutical company which sponsored her researchBoots Pharmaceutical, which later became Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. -spent several years vigorously trying to prevent the publication of these findings, arguing that Dong's research was flawed. Her research results were subjected to two investigations and only very minor problems were found. The conclusion from these investigations was that Boots/Knoll was harassing Dong because it did not want the public to learn these results. What Dong's employer UCSF did was at least as alarming. At first the university's lawyers agreed that Dong could submit her findings to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), even though her research contract, which was approved by the university, required the company's approval for publication. JAMA's reviewers accepted the article and it was scheduled for publication on January 25, 1995, but a few weeks earlier Boots/Knoll threatened to sue
